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as of the date of the institution of the action' 2 (which was before the
marriage) to set aside the transfer.' 3 Thus the creditor's lien attached
before the dower could attach, and a sale to satisfy the prior lien would
effectually bar any dower claim against the defendant purchasers under
such sale. Because of his priority the creditor is entitled to full satis-
faction of his claim out of the proceeds of the sale before other sub-
sequent rights therein are considered. Where, however, the creditors'
claims do not require all of the proceeds, it would seem that the widow
should be entitled to her dower as against the grantee's claim. We have
seen that logically the revesting of the estate in the grantor should be
sufficient to support dower (whether the wife has ever before had dower
in the property or not), and the fraudulent grantee's deed should be
ineffective against rights of the widow and the creditor arising out of
the revesting of title in the grantor. The equity of the widow as against
the grantee is further strengthened by the fact that though her claim is
through her husband's title which is tainted with fraud, she did not
actually participate in the fraud and is not in pari delicto with the
grantee. C. A. GRIFFIN, JR.
Labor Law-State Anti-Injunction Statutes.
Since the advent of the New Deal there has been a rapidly growing
tendency to look upon labor with an increasingly liberal attitude, evi-
denced, in state labor anti-injunction legislation,' by the correction of
the abuses caused by the injunction in labor disputes during the past
fifty years.2 Twenty-three states have enacted such legislation,3 each
'Hancock v. Wooten, 107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199 (1890); Frank v. Kessler, 30
Ind. 8 (1868) ; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106 (1869) ; Wooten v. Steele, 109 Ala.
563 19 So. 972 (1895). Accord: The Dawson Bank v. Harris, 84 N. C. 206 (1881) ;
Armstrong Grocery Co. v. Banks, 185 N. C. 149, 116 S. E. 173 (1923) ; cf. Cas-
sady v. Anderson, 53 Tex. 535 (1880) ; Arbuckle Bros. Coffee Co. v. Werner and
Cohen, 77 Tex. 43, 13 S. W. 963 (1890).
' 'Most jurisdictions require that a judgment be obtained against the grantor
as a condition precedent to the suit to set aside the fraudulent conveyance. Allyn
v. Thurston, 53 N. Y. 622 (1873) ; Estes v. Wilcox, 67 N. Y. 264 (1876) ; Whitney
v. Davis, 148 N. Y. 256, 42 N. E. 661 (1896) ; WAITE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND CREDITORS' BILLS (3d ed. 1897) 149.
'No attempt will be made to consider federal anti-injunction legislation.
2 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) ; Fraenkel, Recent
Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts (1936) 30 ILL. L.
REv. 854.3 ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4286 CAL GEN. LAWS (Deer-
ing, 1931) act 1605; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, §78; Idaho Sess.
Laws 1933, c. 215; ILL. RE V. STAT. ANN. (Cahill, 1933) c. 22, §58; ILL. STAT. ANN.
(Callaghan, Supp. 1925-31) c. 22, §58; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §40-504;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) c. 60, §1107; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp.
1936) §4379.7; ME. LAws 1933, c. 261, §1; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, Supp. 1935) c.
574, §67; Mass. Acts 1935, c. 407, §4; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §§4260-
4264; MONT. REv. CODE- ANN. (Anderson & MtFarland, 1935) §9242; N. J. CObzt.
STAT. (Supp. 1925-30) §107-131a; N. Y. CimL PRAcrics (Cahill, Supp. 1936)
§876a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; OKLA. STAT. 1931, §10878; ORE. CODE ANN.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the statutes having substantially the same provisions.4 Generally,5
they prohibit the courts from enjoining the peaceful activities of labor
in disputes with employers, i.e., striking, holding meetings, publishing
grievances, -peaceful picketing, and using strike funds without restric-
tion.6
The first case involving the validity of an anti-injunction statute to
come before the Supreme Court of the United States7 was that of
Truax v. Corrigans in 1921. The court, in a five to four decision, ruled
the Arizona statute unconstitutional because it violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The state
courts, relying on this decision, have, until recent years, consistently
declared similar statutes invalid.1 °
A change of attitude, however, became apparent during the depres-
sion years with their attendant labor troubles. The Oregon Supreme
Court led the way in 1932 when it pronounced such a statute to be
valid 1 if properly construed. 12 All of the reported cases since 1933,
with the exception of one,' 3 have upheld the validity of anti-injunction
(1930) §§49-902, 49-903; PA. STAT. (Purden, 1936) §43-203; UTAH REV. STAT.
ANN. (1933) §§4-2-6, 4-2-7; WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§1712-
1714; Wis. STAT. 1935, §§103:53, 103:63; Wyo. Sess. Laws 1937, c. 15, §1.
"For a classification and comparison of these statutes, see Riddlesbarger,
State Anti-Injunction Legislation (1935) 14 ORE. L. REv. 501.
'Most of the statutes have additional provisions prohibiting "yellow dog" con-
tracts, ex parte injunctions and the restraint of acts other than those specifically
complained of, and guaranteeing the right to a jury trial to all persons charged
with violating labor injunctions.
Fraenkel, supra note 2, at 871.
'California and Massachusetts anti-injunctitn statutes had been previously
declared unconstitutional by state tribunals, the courts employing substantially the
same reasoning as that applied in. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct.
124, 66 L. ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921) ; Goldberg, Bowen and Co. v. Stablemen's
Union, 149 Cal. 429, 86 Pa< 806, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 460 (1906) ; Pierce v. Stable-
men's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909) ; Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 252,
112 N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1916F 831 (1916).
6257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. ed. 254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921).9Pitney (with whom Clarke, J., concurred), Brandeis, and Holmes, JJ., each
wrote a dissenting opinion maintaining that the statute was a valid exercise of
the police powers of the legislature and that the classification was not so unreason-
able as to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"In -re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931), Note
(1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 666; In re Opinion of the Justices, 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl.
640 (1933), Note (1934) 18 MiNN. L. Rzv. 184; Greenfield v. Central Labor
Council, 104 Ore. 236, 192 Pac. 783 (1922); see Bull v. International Alliance,
119 Kan. 713, 718, 241 Pac. 459, 461 (1925); Elkind and Sons, et al. v. Retail
Clerks' Protective Ass'n, 114 N. J. Eq. 586, 595, 169 AtI. 494, 497 (1933) ; Pacific
Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10, U. M. W. A., 122 Wash. 423, 436, 210 Pac. 953,
957 (1922).
a' Moreland Theaters Corp. v. Portland M. P. M. 0. P. Union, 140 Ore. 35, 12
P. (2d) 333 (1932).
'The validity of these statutes has, from the outset, depended largely upon
whether the courts construed them as legalizing unlawful acts. Many courts look
upon picketing as being unlawful in itself and therefore ruled that the statute
attempted to make an unlawful act legal.
1 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936).
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legislation. These recent decisions have, for the most part, followed the
same line of reasoning: that due process is not violated, for the legis-
lature may, in the exercise of its police powers, make such regulations
as the welfare of the public requires, even to the extent of interfering
with the liberty and property of an individual; that equal protection is
not taken away, for the classification is a reasonable one,' 4 since labor
injunction cases are fundamentally different from ordinary equitable
actions ;15 and that the inherent equity powers of the courts are not
abridged, for the statute, while it limits the jurisdiction of the courts in
prohibiting the issuance of injunctions in certain cases, does not deprive
the courts of the power to restrain unlawful acts.16 The climax in this
change in the attitude of the courts came recently when the United
States Supreme Court declared a Wisconsin anti-injunction statute to
be constitutional, in the first case to reach it since Truax v. Corrigan,
involving the validity of this type of legislation. 17 The court distin-
guishes this case from Truax v. Corrigan on the grounds that in the
latter the Arizona court construed the statute as legalizing picketing,
which at that time was considered to 'be unlawful in any form,' 8 while
in the instant case the Wisconsin court construed the statute as prohibit-
ing the issuance of injunctions only against peaceful picketing, which
is now regarded as being lawful.19 From recent decisions, then, it
appears that: "More and more the tendency is to permit the parties to
The case was decided, in the face of a strong dissent, on the grounds that the
statute violated that section of the state constitution which specifically granted to
the courts the power to issue injunctions. For comments on this case see (1937)
23 VA. L. Rm. 606 and (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 500.
' The courts have uniformly held that the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws to all citizens is not violated by legislation affecting only a
certain group of citizens, as long as the classification is reasonable and there is
no discrimination against members of the group. Labor anti-injunction statutes
apply only to the employee-employer group.
'When an injunction is issued, the striker is immediately branded as a law-
breaker in the eyes of the public. And since strikes are usually short, the issuance
of even a temporary injunction nearly always decides the case immediately. Note
(1934) 18 MINN. L. Rav. 184 at 191.
"Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v. Gottfried, 158 Misc. 758, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832
(1935) ; Dehan v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Beverage Dispensers, 159
So. 637 (La. 1935) ; American Furniture Co. v. T. B. of T. C. and H. of A., 222
Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250, 106 A. L. R. 335 (1936); Starr v. Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Workers' Local Union No. 101, 63 P. (2d) 1104 (Ore. 1936), (1937)
16 ORE. L. Rzv. 192; Fenske Bros. Inc. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358
Ill. 239, 193 N.. E. 112, 97 A. L. R. 1318 (1934), Notes (1935) 30 ILL. L. REV.
237, (1935) 13 CrI-KENT REV. 170, (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 616; Geo. B. Wallace
Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (Ore. 1936) ; see Bayonne
Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 164, 172 At.
551, 559, 92 A. L. R. 1450, 1463 (1934).
" Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, 57 Sup, Ct. 857, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
829 (1937).
" FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. s£1pra note 2, at 171.
" It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Brandeis, who dissented strongly
in Truax v. Corrigan, wrote the majority opinion in the instant case.
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settle their differences without resort to injunction. The old order was
injunction first, the new is injunction last."20
North Carolina has been extremely fortunate in escaping the labor
injunction abuses which have been so prevalent in other jurisdictions.21
The state was untroubled -by labor injunction cases until as late as 1921,
when, in the case of McGinnis v. Raleigh Typographical Union,22 an
injunction was granted which specifically listed the acts28 and the parties
restrained. Three years later, in Citizen v. Asheville Typographical
Union,24 the court became more conservative and affirmed a restraining
order which not only enjoined all picketing, but also contained an all-
inclusive and ambiguous. clause restraining the defendants and all other
persons from "doing any acts or things whatsoever in furtherance of
any conspiracy of combination among themselves or any of them to
obstruct and interfere with the plaintiff or its business .... ,25 In the
third and last North Carolina decision, the unreported case of Marion
Manufacturing Co. v. United Textile Workers,2 6 the injunction was
ambiguous in its terms, and hence, although the court did require that
notice be- personally served on each defendant, there was much con-
fusion as to exactly what acts were enjoined. Thus, while the North
Carolina court in the first case was extremely liberal towards labor, the
injunctions granted in the last two cases are characterized by the vague
sweeping terms which have been the despair of organized labor in other
states ever since "government by injunction" began.28 Both liberalism
and conservatism have ,been exhibited in these three cases, and it is im-
possible to foretell which attitude the North Carolina court will adopt
in the future.
While it is true that the number of labor injunction cases in North
Carolina has been strikingly small in the past, it is inevitable, in view
of the fact that the state is in a- process of rapid industrial growth, that
labor disputes will increase and the injunction tend to become common.
And, since the trend of the courts throughout the nation is to uphold
' Collins, J., in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 159 Misc. 806, 288 N. Y. Supp. 855,
863 (1936).
" McCRACKEN, STRIKE INJuNcTIONs IN THE NaW SOUTH (1931).
182 N. C. 770, 108 S. E. 728 (1921).
' Mass picketing, intimidation of employees, following employees, abusive
epithets, and attempting to persuade employees to break employment contracts.
S187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31 (1924). 1 Id. at 44, 121 S. E. at 32.
SMCCRACKEN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 79. (Superior Court, McDowell
County, July 24, 1929).
w Id. at 84.
'The labor injunction has become an object of hatred for many reasons, but
probably the chief among these is that the courts have, in most cases, issued
restraining orders enjoining almost everybody from doing anything whatsoever
in furtherance of labor's attempts to improve its situation. Due to vagueness and
uncertainty of terms, and the failure to require personal notice to be served on
the defendants, it is often impossible to determine just which acts and parties are
restrained.
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anti-injunction legislation, North Carolina might probably avoid the
abuses which the use of the injunction has thrust upon labor in other
jurisdictions by passing the Model Anti-injunction Act.29
JAmES D. CA.R.
Municipal CorpoTations-Remedies Allowed Holders of
Invalid Bonds-Constructive Trusts.
Municipal bonds, issued for the erection of a school building, were
invalid because the city had no constitutional power to devote funds to
such purposes. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff, holder of the entire bond issue, was
entitled to have the municipality made a constructive trustee of the
school building. This had been built on a city lot with funds supplied
from the bond issue and by the county board of public instruction. The
court decreed that the way was to be left open to the interested parties
(the city, county board, and bondholder) "for such adjustments, whether
by sale or rental, as may be within their several powers." 1 In a previous
action for money had and received the plaintiff had failed because of
the Statute of Limitations. 2 In the instant case there is a clear dictum
that such an action would not lie on the merits, for the city no longer
had the money, nor had it been used for a proper municipal purpose.8
It is settled that no action may be maintained on an invalid municipal
bond. 4 However, where the city had the power both to borrow money
and to devote it to the purposes for which the bonds were issued, the
invalidity being due to mere irregularities in form or manner of issu-
ance, 5 the bondholder may recover for money had and received. 0 The
'Prepared by Nathaniel Greene and Felix Frankfurter, and published by the
National Committee on Labor Injunctions of the American Civil Liberties League,
100 Fifth Ave., New York City.
'Nuveen v. Board of Public Instruction, 88 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937),
cert. denied 57 Sup. Ct. 794. The adjustment would probably be a pro rata share.
But see NuVeen v. Quincy, 115 Fla. 510, 524, 156 So. 153, 159 (1934) (in a dictum
the state court on the same facts said that a constructive trust should be refused).
'State ex tel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (1924).
' See Nuveen v. Board of Public Instruction, 88 F. (2d) 175, 178 (1937).
"Dodge v. Memphis, 51 Fed. 165 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1892) ;1 German Ins. Co. v.
Manning, 95 Fed. 597 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1899); Swanson v. Ottumwa, 131 Iowa
540, 106 N. W. 9 (1906); People's Bank of St. Paul v. School Dist. 3 N. D. 496,
57 N. W. 787 (1893).
r Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294, 26 L. ed. 153 (1880) (not registering bonds
with proper authorities) ; Gause v. Clarksville, 1 Fed. 353 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1880)
(voters in bond election were not sworn properly) ; Geer v. School Dist. No. 11
in Ouray County, 111 Fed. 682 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901), and Fernald v. Gilman, 123
Fed. 797 (C. C. S. D. Iowa: 1903) (municipality, although authorized to become
indebted, was not entitled to secure the money by bonds) ; State ex rel. North-
western Nat. Bank v. Dickerman, 16 Mont. 278, 40 Pac. 698 (1895) (non-com-
pliance with notice requirement) ; Hoag v. Greenwich, 133 N. Y. 152, 30 N. E.
842 (1892) (bonds came due at different dates than allowed by law) ; Rainsburg
v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74, 17 Atl. 678 (1889) (not filing statement as required).0 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 24 L. ed. 659 (1877); Louisiana v.
Wood, 102 U. S. 294, 26 L. ed. 153 (1880) ; Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568,
